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 I analyze the results of an online experiment designed to elicit individuals’ willingness to 
pay for fact-checking of statements related to immigration. Using a control and treatment group, 
I test whether individuals’ willingness to pay is affected by partisan cues. First, I outline this 
research’s position related to existing literature. I then describe the experimental design and 
analyze the results. Partisan cues are shown to have no statistically significant effect on 
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Jennifer Morales 
 
The increased prevalence of misinformation has affected public discourse in America, 
especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. Fact-checking is considered an essential tool to 
combat misinformation. Previous research has shown that individuals are willing to pay for fact-
checking of politically neutral content. However, partisan affiliation accounts for the largest 
difference in Americans’ political values, more than race, gender, religion, or education.  
Immigration debates played a prominent role in the 2020 presidential election and in 
several instances misinformation about immigration was spread by high profile media and 
political figures. Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are more aligned with political 
affiliation than any time on record. Given the polarized political landscape in America, is 
individuals’ willingness to pay for fact-checking effected by the presence of partisan cues? We 
conduct an economic experiment to elicit individuals’ willingness to pay for fact-checking about 
immigration, a highly polarized topic in American politics. We find that partisan cues make 
individuals more likely to believe a statement is true, but find no effect on their willingness to 
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Willingness to Pay for Fact-Checking About Immigration:  





 Misinformation has become more prevalent in the US during the last several years.1 
Increased misinformation has affected public discourse in America, especially during the Covid-
19 pandemic. Concerns about its effects on democratic decision-making have prompted renewed 
research into misinformation and strategies to combat it. As more people turn to social media as 
a news source rather than traditional media, more focus has been given to mechanisms that work 
on distributed networks like social media platforms.2  
 Fact-checking has been suggested as a way to combat misinformation and is a method 
that enjoys support across the political spectrum, although some conservatives argue that bias in 
 
1 Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, “The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online,” Pew Research Center: 
Internet, Science & Tech, October 19, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/the-future-of-truth-
and-misinformation-online/. 
Kashyap Popat et al., “CredEye: A Credibility Lens for Analyzing and Explaining Misinformation,” Companion 
Proceedings of the Web Conference 2018, April 23, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1145/3184558.3186967. 
Michael Dimock and John Gramlich, “How America Changed during Trump’s Presidency,” Pew Research Center, 
January 29, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/2021/01/29/how-america-changed-during-donald-trumps-
presidency/. 
2 Elisa Shearer, “86% of Americans Get News Online from Smartphone, Computer or Tablet,” Pew Research 
Center, January 12, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-
news-from-digital-devices/. 
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fact-checking mechanisms unfairly disfavors Republicans.3 Previous research has shown that 
individuals are willing to pay for fact-checking of politically neutral content.4 
 However, much of the information Americans see online is not politically neutral.5 
Indeed, partisan affiliation accounts for the largest difference in Americans’ political values, 
more than race, gender, religion, or education.6 Among 19 surveyed countries, America is the 
most politically divided, according to PEW.7  
Given the polarized political landscape in America, does individuals’ willingness to pay 
for fact-checking vary by political affiliation? Further, is willingness to pay for fact-checking 
affected by the presence of partisan cues? We conduct an economic experiment to elicit 
individuals’ willingness to pay for fact-checking of statements regarding immigration, a highly 
polarized topic in American politics.  
 Immigration is one area where misinformation has garnered much attention, particularly 
during the Trump administration. Concerns about migrant caravans and treatment of immigrants 
and asylum-seekers at US border facilities prompted public debate, media attention, and 
misinformation.8 Immigration policy was also a frequent topic during the 2020 presidential 
 
3 Emily Vogels, Andrew Perrin, and Monica Anderson, “Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor Political 
Viewpoints,” Pew Research Center, August 19, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-
americans-think-social-media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/. 
4 Prithvijit Mukherjee and Lucas Rentschler, “Willingness to Pay for Fact-Checking in a Partisan World,” 
Forthcoming, n.d. 
5 Jeffrey M. Jones and Zacc Ritter, “Americans See More News Bias; Most Can’t Name Neutral Source” Gallup, 
January 17, 2018. https://news.gallup.com/poll/225755/americans-news-bias-name-neutral-source.aspx 
6 “In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions,” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & 
Policy, December 17, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarized-era-sharp-
divides-in-both-partisan-coalitions/. 
7 Michael Dimock and Richard Wilke, “America Is Exceptional in Its Political Divide,” Pew Research Center, 
March 29, 2021, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/trust/archive/winter-2021/america-is-exceptional-in-its-political-
divide. 
8 Robert Farley, Eugene Kiely, and Lori Robertson, “Fact Checking Trump’s Immigration Tweets,” FactCheck.org, 
April 3, 2018, https://www.factcheck.org/2018/04/factchecking-trumps-immigration-tweets/. 
Noor Wazwaz, “Thousands Swell Ranks of U.S.-Bound Migrant Caravan in Mexico,” NPR.org, October 21, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/21/659327955/migrant-caravan-grows-to-5-000. 
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election. Surveys show that immigration attitudes in the US have become more polarized in the 
last decade and are now more closely correlated with political party preference than at any time 
on record.9  
Misinformation has been shown to spread more quickly than truthful information on 
social media platforms like Twitter.10 People, not bots, are the main drivers of misinformation 
spread on social media.11 While some users intentionally share false information, most do so 
unwittingly. Most users agree that it is very important to share only accurate information online, 
but the incentives of social media interactions and factors like distraction and inattention lead 
many to share misinformation anyway.12 For example, partisanship has been shown to have a 
significant effect on users' willingness to share misinformation. Whether a headline matches 
prior partisan beliefs or not is a more salient factor than whether it is accurate for many social 
media users when deciding whether or not to share a news article.13  
Social media platforms are reluctant to suppress misinformation because it generates 
engagement and advertising revenue.14 Since relying on social media companies to reject 
financial incentives has proved largely unsuccessful, researchers have examined other means to 
prevent the spread of misinformation.  
 
9 Michael Hout and Christopher Maggio, “Immigration, Race & Political Polarization,” Daedalus 150, no. 2 (2021): 
40–55, https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01845. 
“Views on Race and Immigration,” Pew Research Center, December 17, 2019, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/views-on-race-and-immigration/. 
10 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” Science 359, no. 
6380 (March 8, 2018): 1146–51, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Gordon Pennycook et al., “Shifting Attention to Accuracy Can Reduce Misinformation Online,” Nature 592,  
(March 17, 2021): 590-595, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03344-2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Andrew Hutchinson, “New Study Shows That Misinformation Sees Significantly More Engagement than Real 
News on Facebook,” Social Media Today, May 22, 2019, https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/new-study-
shows-that-misinformation-sees-significantly-more-engagement-than/555286/. 
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There is evidence that nudging people to think about the accuracy of a headline makes 
them less likely to share misinformation.15 However, individuals respond differently to fact-
checking depending on the political content of the information and their own political affiliations 
and attitudes.16 Past scholarship has focused on how political ideology influences people’s 
willingness to pay for fact-checking about political topics in general. 
 An online experiment from the Warwick school found that demand for fact-checking of 
a politics newsletter was low when the source was ideologically aligned with the survey 
respondent.17 Fact-checking saw increased demand among all respondents when the source 
differed ideologically from respondents’ own views. This indicates that fact-checking could 
potentially help reduce misinformation by taking advantage of partisans’ willingness to fact-
check the other party. This would be most beneficial if users share information and interact with 
people of diverse ideological preferences on social media, so users are exposed to fact-checking 
of their preferred and trusted sources. 
While some studies have likely overestimated the degree of ideological segregation on 
social media, there is evidence that some social media users primarily interact with other people 
who have similar ideological preferences.18 So-called “echo chambers” may mean that people do 
not organically come across information on social media that challenges their beliefs or presents 
alternative points of view.19 Similar to online echo chambers, the political leanings of a persons’ 
 
15 Pennycook, “Shifting Attention to Accuracy Can Reduce Misinformation Online,” 593. 
16 Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions,” Political 
Behavior 32, no. 2 (March 30, 2010): 303–30, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2. 
17 Felix Chopra, Ingar Haaland, and Christopher Roth, “The Demand for Fact-Checking” Warwick Economics 
Research Papers, no. 1357 ( May 2021), 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2021/twerp_1357_-_roth.pdf. 
18 Elizabeth Dubois and Grant Blank, “The Echo Chamber Is Overstated: The Moderating Effect of Political Interest 
and Diverse Media,” Information, Communication & Society 21, no. 5 (January 29, 2018): 729–45, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2018.1428656. 
19 Pablo Barberá et al., “Tweeting from Left to Right,” Psychological Science 26, no. 10 (August 21, 2015): 1531–
42, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615594620. 
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friends and family can influence how often they are exposed to differing ideological viewpoints. 
To examine this, we gathered data on how many of a respondent’s friends and family belong to 
each political party through a survey question. Ninety-six percent of respondents said they had at 
least a few friends or family who were Democrats and 46.9% of respondents said more than half 
their friends and family were Democrats. Somewhat fewer respondents had at least a few 
Republican friends and family at 86.5%, while 26% of respondents said more than half their 
friends and family were Republicans.  
Our experiment focuses on how partisan cues influence people’s willingness to pay for 
fact-checking about immigration topics. Attitudes about immigration are highly polarized and 
correlated with political affiliation.20 We hypothesized that respondents would be more likely to 
believe statements from ideologically aligned sources, and therefore less willing to pay for fact-
checking of those sources. This would be in direct contradiction to preferred fact-checking 
behavior, since people are more likely to believe things that align with their prior beliefs, 
whether or not they are true.21 However, we found that partisan cues have no significant effect on 
individuals’ willingness to pay for fact-checking. There is also no significant effect on how 






20 Andrew Daniller, “Americans’ Immigration Policy Priorities: Divisions between – and within – the Two Parties,” 
Pew Research Center (November 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/12/americans-
immigration-policy-priorities-divisions-between-and-within-the-two-parties/. 
21 Stephan Lewandowsky et al., “Misinformation and Its Correction,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 
13, no. 3 (September 17, 2012): 106–31, https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018. 
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Methodology and Experimental Design 
 
 Economic research has increasingly made use of randomized experiments in the several 
decades. Experimental data permits researchers to glean insights that are difficult to achieve with 
observational data and enable economists to make ceteris paribus comparisons, allowing for 
valid estimates of causal effects. In non-experimental studies, much effort is spent identifying 
how to correctly estimate treatment effects in the absence of randomization.22 Many 
observational studies rely on a policy change as a treatment. Identifying individuals in a 
population who were affected by the policy change can sometimes be imprecise. Experiments 
allow researchers to easily determine exactly which individuals are affected by the treatment.23  
 One concern about economic experiments is that they are not generalizable from a lab 
setting to a field setting. Similar to traditional observational studies, this concern can be resolved 
through replication and running related experiments in similar contexts.24 Any experiment has a 
limited scope and conclusions from one study should not be generalized without additional 
research. An additional benefit of experiments is a reduction in bias effects. In many 
experiments, including our own, subjects are not aware that they are taking part in an experiment 
which can help avoid bias issues.25  
 Data for this research was collected from an online experiment using the website Prolific, 
an online platform where volunteers are paid to participate in research studies. Volunteers were 
 
22 Omar Al-Ubaydli and John A. List, “On the Generalizability of Experimental Results in Economics: With a 
Response to Camerer,” National Bureau of Economic Research, (November 21, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19666. 
23 Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, (November 6, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14467. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Al-Ubaydli and List, “On the Generalizability of Experimental Results in Economics: With a Response to 
Camerer,” 8. 
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paid a minimum of $3 to complete our survey, and could earn more based on how accurate their 
answers were. The monetary amounts are denoted throughout the experiment in Experimental 
Francs (EF). At the end of the experiment payoff is made to participants in US dollars at a rate of 
40EF=$1. Respondents are aware of the exchange rate and are given instructions indicating how 
their payoff will be calculated. 
There were 450 survey respondents. Roughly a third are registered to vote with each 
political affiliation. Interestingly, there is some difference between political party affiliation and 
self-stated political ideology. Forty-two percent of respondents consider themselves Democrats, 
but only thirty-one percent identify as liberal. Meanwhile, 35% identify as Republican but 42% 
consider themselves conservative. To outline other basic demographics, 50.88% of respondents 
were female and 47.79% were male. Caucasian respondents represented 69% of the survey pool, 
African Americans 9%, and Asians 12%.   
Using an economic experiment, we elicit individuals’ beliefs regarding the accuracy of 
thirty statements related to immigration. The statements are previously fact-checked by Politifact 
or Snopes and rated as True or False. To determine whether partisan cues influence individuals’ 
beliefs and willingness to pay for fact-checking, we separate the participants into a control group 
and a treatment group. The control group sees the same thirty statements that the treatment group 
sees, but does not see who made the statement. The treatment group sees the thirty statements 
and also whether the statement was made by a Democrat or a Republican.  
We use a quadratic scoring rule to elicit beliefs, with respondents indicating their beliefs 
about the veracity of statements on a scale of 0-100.26 Participants are told that they will be paid 
based on how close their beliefs are to the True or False third-party rating. This incentivizes 
 
26 Selten, R. “Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule,” Experimental Economics 1, 43–61 (1998). 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009957816843. 
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them to pay attention and makes them less likely to answer ideologically if their ideological bias 
runs opposite the stated fact.  
After reporting their beliefs regarding the veracity of a statement, respondents then 
disclose how much they are willing to pay to see each of the statements fact-checked. There are 
six possible costs, and respondents do not know how much the actual price of fact-checking will 
be when they indicate their willingness to pay, just that it will be within the range given. For 
each statement, the cost of the fact-check is randomly assigned between zero dollars to slightly 
over one dollar (0EF-50EF).  
All of the statements are fact-checked if the participant has indicated they are willing to 
pay the randomly selected cost of fact-checking, but only one of the thirty statements is 
randomly picked for payment to the participant. To calculate payment, respondents’ beliefs are 
updated following fact-checking and then the cost of the fact-check is deducted. If the statement 
is false and the respondent has paid for fact-checking, their beliefs automatically update to 0 and 
if the statement is true, beliefs update to 100.  
 After stating their beliefs and indicating their willingness to pay, respondents then 
complete a task designed to elicit their risk preferences. They are presented with a grid of boxes 
and told that behind one of the 100 boxes is a “bomb”. One box will be revealed per second, and 
for each box uncovered the participant earns 2EF. If the “bomb” is uncovered, the participant 
loses all the earnings associated with the previously uncovered boxes. The final step of the 
experiment is a survey questionnaire which asks about respondents’ political views, news 
consumption, and personality traits (using the OCEAN framework).27 
 
 
27 Lewis R. Goldberg, “An Alternative ‘Description of Personality’: The Big-Five Factor Structure.,” Journal of 




In our experiment, partisan cues were varied on a between-subjects basis. Since there is likely to 
be correlation of responses for a given individual, we use individual level data for our statistical 
tests. We report results for four main variables of interest: Overall beliefs, accuracy of beliefs 
(distance from the truth), certainty, and willingness to pay for fact-checking.  
We find that Democrats are on average more skeptical than Republicans or Independents, 
with lower overall belief scores. Republicans are the most likely to believe a statement is true (at 
50.5%).  
We found that partisan cues had no significant effect on any of our four variables of 
interest: overall belief, distance from the truth, certainty, or willingness to pay for fact-checking. 
Democrats were on average more accurate about the veracity of statements than Republicans or 
Independents. Republicans were the least likely to be correct about a statement’s truthfulness, 
with an average distance from the truth of 43 compared to Democrats’ 33.  
The fact that respondents’ willingness to pay for fact-checking is not affected 
meaningfully by partisan cues could be a positive sign. Respondents appear equally willing to 
pay to fact-check their own party or the opposition. Since people are more likely to believe 
statements that match their previously held beliefs, a willingness to pay to fact-check statements 
they agree with could help prevent the spread of misinformation.  
One contribution of this paper is that it shows that demand exists among individuals for 
fact-checking. The average willingness to pay among respondents was 20EFs ($0.50), out of a 
possible 50EFs ($1.25). Given that people tend to seek information that aligns with their views, 
 10 
fact-checking may provide an important mechanism to help people be better informed.28 There is 
evidence that fact-checking induces people to update their beliefs, with relatively persistent time 
effects.29 However, willingness to update beliefs following fact-checking is mitigated by political 
ideology and emotion.30 Further research could explore under what circumstances individuals’ 














28 Ana Lucía Schmidt et al., “Anatomy of News Consumption on Facebook,” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 114, no. 12 (March 6, 2017): 3035–39, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1617052114. 
29 Dustin Carnahan, Daniel E. Bergan, and Sangwon Lee, “Do Corrective Effects Last? Results from a Longitudinal 
Experiment on Beliefs toward Immigration in the U.S.,” Political Behavior, January 9, 2020, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09591-9. 
30 John Cook, Ullrich Ecker, and Stephan Lewandowsky, “Misinformation and How to Correct It” Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest 13, no. 3 (September 17, 2012), https://www.cssn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/Misinformation-and-how-to-correct-it-John-Cook.pdf. 
Brian E. Weeks, “Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety Moderate the Effect of 
Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation,” Journal of Communication 65, no. 4 (June 19, 2015): 
699–719, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164. 
 
 
